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Abstract
Stressing the inßuence of expected devaluation on currency crises, this paper shows that, in a
Þxed exchange-rate system with an escape clause, partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to an
inßation-averse central banker reduces the probability of crisis.
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1 Introduction
A well-known result in the literature on currency crisis is that the cost of defending a Þxed
rate increases when private agents expect a devaluation (Krugman, 1998). In this context,
this paper considers partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to a central banker who is
more inßation averse than the government: the decision as to whether to maintain the peg
is left to the government, but the magnitude of any realignment is delegated to the central
banker. Looking at the inßuence of expected devaluation, it shows that, in a Þxed exchange-
rate system with an escape clause, this partial delegation reduces the probability of crisis.
In particular, it underlines the fact that it is more eﬀective to devolve exchange-rate policy
when private agents expect a future realignment, as the reduction of the probability of crisis
∗Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex, UB8 3PH, UK. Tel:
++44-1895-203386, fax: ++441895-203384. E-mail address: Virginie.Boinet@brunel.ac.uk.
I would like to thank John Bennett, Eric Girardin, Christos Ioannidis and Chris Martin for very helpful
comments.
1
is greater. These results are strengthened if the central bankers degree of inßation aversion
is greater, for the probability of self-fulÞlling crisis is reduced and the stability of the Þxed
exchange-rate system increased.
2 Partial delegation
2.1 The model
The framework is based on a model of currency crisis à la Obtsfeld (1994). In a small open
economy, the log of employment n can be expressed by
n = n∗ + ρ (Π− Πe) n∗ = 0, ρ > 0 (1)
where Π and Πe denote actual and expected inßation. The natural employment rate n∗ is
assumed to be zero. Inßation expectations are formed at the beginning of the period as
private agents sign nominal contracts. Then Þrms determine the demand for labor and the
policy maker decides whether to maintain the peg.
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) holds. Foreign prices are exogenous and normalized to 1.
Control of exchange-rate variations ∆e and of the inßation rate Π are therefore equivalent.
The aim of exchange-rate or monetary policy is to minimize deviations of inßation and
employment from their target levels. The loss functions of the government and the central
banker are respectively
LG =
1
2
£
Π2 + (n− en)2¤+ ΩC (2)
LCB =
1
2
£
(1+ ε)Π2+(n− en)2¤ (3)
The target level of employment en is above the natural rate, and so can be interpreted as an
inßationary bias. The inßation target is zero. C represents the realignment cost incurred
by the policy maker (in terms of credibility for instance) after the abandonment of the peg.
Consequently, Ω is a binary variable equal to 0 when the policy maker maintains the peg
and equal to 1 when he devalues. We assume partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to a
central banker who has the same targets as the policy maker but who places greater weight
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on the costs of higher inßation (ε > 0).1 There is no cost of realignment to the central banker
because it is the government that decides whether realignment occurs. Therefore, when the
policy maker decides to devalue, exchange-rate policy is delegated to the central banker and
∆e is determined such that ∂L
BC
∂∆e
= 0, that is,
Π = ∆e =
ρ
1+ ε+ ρ2
(ρΠe + en) (4)
The more the central banker is inßation averse (ε high), the smaller is the inßuence of
inßationary expectations and the employment target on the devaluation rate.
Information available for the formation of inßation expectations is the same as that for
the policy maker except that private agents do not know the realignment cost C. Therefore,
they cannot perfectly forecast the Þnal decision of the policy maker. If economic agents
expect the maintenance of the peg, then Πe = 0. If they expect a devaluation, Πe = Π, that
is,
Πe =
ρ
1+ ε
en (5)
Inßation expectations increase with the inßationary bias en while they decrease with the
central bankers degree of inßation aversion.
2.2 The realignment condition and eﬀects of partial delegation
When the government defends the peg, it follows that Π = ∆e = 0. When it proceeds to a
realignment, Π is expressed by equation (4) . Inserting (1) into (2), the governments loss in
the two respective situations is found as
LGFX =
1
2
(ρΠe + en) 2 (6)
LGFL =
ρ2 + (1+ ε)2
2 (1+ ε+ ρ2)2
(ρΠe + en) 2 + C (7)
1The delegation is partial as there is a cost to the government when a realignment occurs. To take this
cost into account, the decision as to whether to maintain the peg is left to the government, but the magnitude
of any realignment is delegated to the central banker.
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This loss depends positively on inßation expectations and the inßationary bias. As a result,
the policy maker will decide to devalue if LGFX − LGFL > 0, that is,
ρ2 (1+ 2ε+ ρ2)
2 (1+ ε+ ρ2)2
(ρΠe + en)2 > C (8)
This inequality indicates that the probability of realignment increases when expected inßa-
tion and the inßationary bias are higher and when the realignment cost C is smaller.
Taking into account inßation expectations, thresholds under which the government will
decide to devalue are equal to
CWD1 =
ρ2 (1+ 2ε+ ρ2)
2 (1+ ε+ ρ2)2
en2 (9)
CWD2 =
ρ2 (1+ 2ε+ ρ2)
2 (1+ ε)2
en2 (10)
CWD1 is the threshold which prevails when private agents expect no devaluation (Π
e = 0),
whileCWD2 is the threshold which prevails when private agents expect a realignment (Π
e = Π).
Note that CWD1 and C
WD
2 are both positive and that C
WD
1 < C
WD
2 . At one threshold C
WD
2 ,
as inßationary expectations are high, competitiveness and unemployment problems are so
painful that a devaluation occurs unless the realignment cost is very high. At the other
threshold CWD1 , the policy maker will maintain the peg even if the realignment cost is low.
Multiple equilibria occur between CWD1 and C
WD
2 . Therefore, if C belongs to this interval,
the government can either defend the peg or realign. The decision depends on private agents
expectations. This implies that crises are self-fulÞlling.
We consider here delegation to a central banker who is more inßation averse than the
government. ε = 0 represents the case of no delegation as then government and central
banker have exactly the same preferences and targets. Let CNDi , where i = 1, 2, denote
thresholds obtained when the government does not delegate exchange-rate policy. Putting
ε = 0 into (9) and (10),
CND1 =
ρ2
2 (1+ ρ2)
en2 (11)
CND2 =
ρ2 (1+ ρ2)
2
en2 (12)
Note that CND1 and C
ND
2 are both positive and that for the same reasons as previously
CND1 < C
ND
2 . The comparison of these diﬀerent thresholds leads to the following proposition.
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Proposition 1. Partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to a more inßation-averse central
banker reduces the level of the thresholds.
This proposition is conÞrmed by the following inequality.
CWDi < C
ND
i where i = 1, 2 (13)
So, whatever private agents expectations, with partial delegation to a more inßation-averse
central banker, the probability of crisis is reduced. The policy maker maintains the peg while
the cost of realignment is smaller. This result can be explained by the negative (downward)
inßuence of partial delegation on expected inßation. As the cost of defending a Þxed rate
decreases when private agents expect its maintenance, the probability of crisis is reduced.
This suggests that the eﬀect of partial delegation on the probability of crisis is more eﬀective
when private agents expect a future realignment. This idea is conÞrmed by the proposition
below.
Proposition 2. Partial delegation of exchange-rate policy to a more inßation-averse central
banker decreases the gap between the two thresholds.
This proposition gives additional information concerning the evolution of thresholds.
Proposition 1 indicates that, with partial delegation, the probability of crisis is reduced at
each threshold. Proposition 2 speciÞes that the probability of crisis is reduced more at CWD2
than at CWD1 . Therefore, as the peg is more fragile at C
WD
2 and the strategy of partial
delegation more eﬃcient, expectations of devaluation strengthen the need of implementing
this strategy. It is conÞrmed by the following inequality.
CWD2 − CWD1 < CND2 − CND1 (14)
As illustrated in Figure 1, the area of multiple equilibria is reduced. We write 1 when the
government devalues and 0 when it defends the peg. The Þrst number indicates the policy
makers decision in the case of no delegation and the second number the policy makers
decision when exchange-rate policy is partially delegated to a more inßation-averse central
banker.
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Policy maker’s 
decision 
C1ND C2ND 
C 
Figure 1 
C1WD C2WD 
(1,1) (1,1) 
(1,0) 
(1,1) 
(1,0) 
(0,1) 
(0,0) 
(1,0) 
(0,0) (0,0) 
Whether CWD2 ≶ CND1 depends on the value of ε. Using (9) and (10), we Þnd
∂CWDi
∂ε
< 0 where i = 1, 2 (15)
∂
¡
CWD2 − CWD1
¢
∂ε
< 0 (16)
Thus, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The more the central banker is inßation averse,
i) the lower is the level of thresholds;
ii) the smaller is the gap between the two thresholds.
This last proposition means that, whatever inßation expectations, the probability of crisis
decreases with the central bankers degree of inßation aversion and that the magnitude of
this reduction is higher when private agents expect a devaluation. If ε is very high, expected
inßation is close to zero (see (5)). Then, CWD1 is lower and the interval between C
WD
2
and CWD1 substantially decreases. At the extreme, C
WD
1 is close to zero and C
WD
2 close to
CWD1 . C
WD
2 then becomes smaller than C
ND
1 . Self-fulÞlling crises are avoided. One threshold
remains at which the probability of crisis is considerably reduced.
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